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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefits Act ("Coal Act"), 26 U.S.C.S 9701-9722, to 
ensure that retired coal miners and their dependents would 
continue to receive the health and death benefits they had 
been receiving since the 1940s pursuant to a series of 
collective bargaining agreements. By the late 1980s, 
problems had arisen that caused serious under-funding to 
the two benefit plans funding the miners' benefits. Fearing 
that the miners and their families would be left with no 
health or death benefits, Congress stepped in and passed 
the Coal Act, which provided a new funding mechanism 
under which the Commissioner of Social Security 
("Commissioner") would assign miners to a coal industry 
employer based on the recency and longevity of a miner's 
employment. That employer then would be responsible for 
providing the funds for those miners' benefits. 
 
The Coal Act has led to a flood of litigation challenging 
the Commissioner's assignments of liability under the Act, 
as well as Takings and Due Process challenges to the 
constitutional validity of the Act's imposition of retroactive 
liability. Following this legal trend, Anker Energy Corp. 
("Anker") filed this action in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief that the Commissioner improperly 
assigned it responsibility for funding certain miners' 
benefits and that these assignments violated the Takings 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Anker also asserted that 
appellee Consolidation Coal Co. ("Consol") had agreed to 
assume liability for any payments due for miners' benefits 
and to reimburse Anker for any such payments Anker 
made, and thus was liable to it for the monies attributable 
to the assignments. 
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The district court dismissed all of these claims at the 
pleadings and summary judgment stages of litigation. First, 
the court granted Consol's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) on Anker's 
claims that the Commissioner should have assigned the 
miners to Consol, and that Consol had agreed to indemnify 
Anker for any liability it incurred for the payment of miners' 
benefits. See Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 
Civ. No. 96-1938 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 1997) (Anker I). 
Subsequently, the district court upheld the constitutionality 
of the application of the Coal Act to Anker on a motion for 
summary judgment. See Anker Energy Corp. v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., Civ. No. 96-1938 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 
1998) (Anker II). Finally, inasmuch as it had affirmed the 
imposition of liability against Anker and had determined 
that Anker was delinquent in its payments under the Act, 
the district court entered a judgment of $1,180,489.06 
against Anker for annual premiums, interest, liquidated 
damages, attorney's fees, and costs. See Anker Energy Corp. 
v. Consolidation Coal Co., Civ. No. 96-1938 (W.D. Pa. July 
21, 1998) (Anker III). This appeal followed. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
The courts have well-chronicled the history of the coal 
industry's struggles to provide retirement and health 
benefits to miners. See, e.g., Unity Real Estate Co. v. 
Hudson, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 167765, at *2-*4 (3d Cir. 
Mar. 29, 1999); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, ___, 
118 S.Ct. 2131, 2137-42 (1998) (plurality opinion). 
Therefore, we only briefly will summarize this chronology 
and outline the parties' roles within that larger story. 
 
In 1947, the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") 
and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association ("BCOA") 
agreed upon the first of a series of National Bituminous 
Wage Agreements ("NBCWA" or "wage agreement"), which 
specified the terms and conditions of employment and 
provided health and pension benefits for miners. The 1947 
NBCWA established the United Mine Workers of America 
Welfare and Retirement Fund, which used the proceeds of 
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a royalty on coal production to provide pension and medical 
benefits for miners and their families. The 1947 NBCWA did 
not specify the benefits to which miners and their families 
were entitled, instead leaving this task to three trustees in 
charge of the Fund. In 1950 the union and the industry 
association agreed upon a new NBCWA that created a new 
Fund financed by a per ton levy on coal mined by signatory 
operators. Like the 1947 Fund, the 1950 version did not 
promise specific benefits, and the benefits were always 
subject to cancellation or change. 
 
This system did not change significantly until 1974 
when, to comply with the newly enacted ERISA, the UMWA 
and the BCOA negotiated a new wage agreement that 
created four trusts funded by royalties on coal production 
and premiums based on hours worked by miners. Under 
the new agreement, the 1950 Benefit Plan covered miners 
who retired before January 1, 1976, and their dependents, 
while the 1974 Benefit Plan covered miners who retired 
after 1975 and their dependents. Both Plans provided non- 
pension benefits, including medical benefits. 
 
The 1974 NBCWA explained that it was amending the 
previous system to provide health benefits for retired 
miners "for life," and to their widows until death or 
remarriage. Because of this broadened coverage the number 
of eligible benefit recipients increased dramatically, and the 
Plans began losing money. 
 
In response, the 1978 NBCWA assigned responsibility to 
signatory employers for the health care of their own active 
and retired employees. The 1978 agreement also restricted 
the 1974 Plan so that it would provide health benefits only 
for "orphaned" retirees, those whose last employer had gone 
out of business or otherwise ceased contributing to the 
Plans. To ensure the Plans' solvency, the 1978 NBCWA 
included a "guarantee" clause that obligated signatories to 
make sufficient contributions to maintain benefits during 
that agreement, and the union and operators amended the 
Plans to include "evergreen clauses" that required 
signatories to contribute to the Plans if they remained in 
the coal business even if they never signed another wage 
agreement. 
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Despite the 1978 NBCWA and subsequent attempts to 
improve the Plans, they continued to lose money because of 
the increase in beneficiaries, the escalating costs of health 
care, and the flood of signatory companies abandoning the 
Plans. In 1992 Congress responded by passing the Coal 
Act. The Act merged the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans into 
a new multi-employer plan called the United Mine Workers 
of America Combined Benefit Fund ("Combined Fund"). The 
Combined Fund provides "substantially the same" health 
benefits to retirees and their dependents that the 1950 and 
1974 Plans provided. 26 U.S.C. S 9703(b)(1), (f). However, 
Congress altered the funding mechanism, an action that 
has led to the overflow of litigation. 
 
The Act finances the Combined Fund with annual 
premiums assessed against signatory operators, which are 
companies that were or are signatories to a "coal wage 
agreement." 26 U.S.C. S 9701(c)(1). The Act defines a "coal 
wage agreement" as an NBCWA, or "any other agreement 
entered into between an employer in the coal industry and 
the United Mine Workers of America that required" the 
provision of health benefits to its retirees or contributions 
to the 1950, 1974 or any prior Benefit Plan. 26 U.S.C. 
S 9701(b)(1)(A), (B). Any signatory operator who "conducts 
or derives revenue from any business activity, whether or 
not in the coal industry," may be required to contribute to 
the Combined Fund. 26 U.S.C. SS 9701(c)(7), 9706(a). 
Where a signatory operator is no longer involved in any 
business activity, premiums may be assessed against 
"related person[s]" including "successors in interest and 
businesses or corporations under common control." Eastern 
Enters., 524 U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2142 (discussing 26 
U.S.C. SS 9701(c)(2)(A), 9706(a)). 
 
The Commissioner of Social Security assigns retirees to 
particular signatory operators, and calculates premiums 
according to these assignments based on the following 
formula: 
 
       (a) In general. -- For purposes of this chapter, the 
       Commissioner of Social Security shall . . . assign each 
       coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a 
       signatory operator which (or any related person with 
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       respect to which) remains in business in the following 
       order: 
 
       (1) First, to the signatory operator which -- 
 
        (A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage 
       agreement or any subsequent coal wage 
       agreement, and 
 
        (B) was the most recent signatory operator to 
       employ the coal industry retiree in the coal 
       industry for at least 2 years. 
 
       (2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under 
       paragraph (1), to the signatory operator which -- 
 
        (A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage 
       agreement or any subsequent coal wage 
       agreement, and 
 
        (B) was the most recent signatory operator to 
       employ the coal industry retiree in the coal 
       industry. 
 
       (3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under 
       paragraph (1) or (2), to the signatory operator which 
       employed the coal industry retiree in the coal 
       industry for a longer period of time than any other 
       signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 
       1978 coal wage agreement. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 9706(a). 
 
The surge of litigation attacking the Coal Act began 
shortly after the Commissioner began assigning retirees to 
signatory operators. In Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 
90 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 1996), we held the Act constitutional 
as applied to a coal company to which the Commissioner 
had assigned retirees through section 9706(a)(3) concerning 
those signatory operators who had not signed the 1978 
agreement. See id. at 695. However, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 
2131, calls the continuing vitality of Lindsey Coal Mining 
into question, as the Court found the Act unconstitutional 
as applied to a coal company that had ceased mining in 
1965 and never signed the 1974 or subsequent wage 
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agreements. Id. at 2153 (plurality opinion); id. at 2154 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
We recently have had the opportunity to apply the 
fragmented Eastern Enterprises decision to facts similar to 
those here. In Unity Real Estate, 1999 WL 167765, we 
upheld the Commissioner's assessment of liability against 
two companies that had signed the 1974 and 1978 wage 
agreements and later NBCWAs as constitutional in the face 
of takings and due process challenges. Id. at *25, *29. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
The seeds of discontent that led to this suit were sown on 
March 30, 1994, when the Commissioner informed Anker 
that she was assigning it liability for certain retired miners, 
surviving spouses and dependents, and several orphaned 
miners due to its relationship with King Knob Coal Co. 
("King Knob") which no longer was in business. From 1967 
until 1982, Consol had contracted with King Knob for it to 
extract coal on certain of Consol's properties. As part of 
these contracts, King Knob agreed that "its employees shall 
be members of the United Mine Workers of America and it 
shall be a signatory to the then current National 
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement." App. at 75. 
 
To achieve this end, King Knob signed "me too" 
agreements during the 1970s and 1980s, the last in 1984. 
See app. at 8. Anker characterizes a "me too" agreement as 
an agreement between an employer who was not a member 
of the BCOA nor an NBCWA signatory yet who agreed by 
separate instrument with the UMWA to "be bound by the 
terms of the NBCWAs." App. at 8. 
 
An affiliate of Anker acquired King Knob in 1975. The 
parties' relationship continued uneventfully until Consol 
canceled its contracts with King Knob following which they 
entered into a settlement agreement on July 23, 1982. 
Paragraph 4(b) of the settlement required Consol to 
 
       promptly reimburse King Knob for all subsequent 
       payments due to the UMWA Fund or any successor 
       fund attributable to (i) tonnage of coal produced under 
       the contracts, (ii) hours worked at the mine operated 
       under the Robinson Run contract on or before August 
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       31, 1982, and (iii) hours worked at the mines operated 
       under the Booth contract on or before June 30, 1982. 
 
App. at 17, 97. 
 
In 1994 and 1995, the Commissioner informed Anker 
that it was a related person to King Knob and was being 
assigned liability for a number of beneficiaries under the 
Coal Act. Arguing that Consol was the proper signatory 
operator responsible for some of these retirees under the 
Act as they worked at Consol's properties and Consol was 
responsible for them, Anker protested this assignment. The 
Commissioner responded that Anker's liability was based 
upon the fact that King Knob (not Consol) was the signatory 
employer of the eligible retirees. Moreover, the 
Commissioner determined that she was not authorized to 
assign Anker's premiums to Consol despite the parties' 
possible contractual agreement for reimbursement of future 
benefits because the Social Security Administration "is not 
bound by any private agreements made between 
companies, nor does the Coal Act allow for pro-ration of 
premium payments between companies." App. at 33. 
 
Anker and King Knob responded by filing this action 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that Consol is 
liable for any premiums due the Combined Fund, and that 
the Commissioner's assessment of liability to the Combined 
Fund under the Coal Act violates the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. As a matter of convenience we usually 
refer to Anker alone as the plaintiff and appellant. Besides 
Consol, Anker named the UMWA Combined Fund, its 
Trustees and the Commissioner as defendants. 
 
In an unpublished disposition, the district court granted 
Consol's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) as to Counts One and Two of Anker's 
complaint. Anker I at 2. In Count One, Anker alleged that 
Consol had agreed with King Knob and the UMWA that it 
would pay the premiums owed to the 1950 and 1974 Plans 
based upon the amount of coal produced and the hours 
worked by King Knob's employees. Id. at 13. Anker 
contended that because of these agreements, Consol 
became the signatory operator responsible for King Knob's 
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employees' benefits under the 1950 and 1974 Plans, and 
thus was the proper party to which the Commissioner 
should assign King Knob's retirees. Id. at 14. 
 
The district court held that Anker could not support this 
claim and granted Consol judgment as a matter of law on 
Count One. Id. The court recognized that "it is undisputed 
that King Knob was a signatory to one or more coal wage 
agreements covering its employees at Consol's Booth and 
Robinson Run properties, and that Anker is a `related 
person' to King Knob as defined in the Coal Act." Id. at 15. 
King Knob was also clearly the employer of the miners. Id. 
at 20. Thus, the Commissioner's assignment of 
beneficiaries and liability under the Act to Anker as a 
related person to King Knob was correct. Id. at 21. 
Moreover, the court refuted Anker's argument that Consol 
had agreed in 1982 to be responsible for any future 
contributions owed to a subsequent benefit plan, and 
agreed with the Commissioner that the Coal Act does not 
allow for the assessment of liability based upon private 
contracts. Id. at 15-16. 
 
The court also granted Consol's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings on Count Two, which alleged that pursuant 
to their settlement agreement Consol was liable to Anker for 
all premiums for which Anker is responsible under the Act. 
Id. at 21. The court rejected Anker's argument that 
paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement bound Consol 
to reimburse King Knob, and thus Anker, for its liability 
under the Coal Act, reasoning that premiums under the Act 
are not 
 
       `attributable to' the tonnage of coal produced and the 
       number of hours worked under the contract mining 
       agreements, and the Combined Fund is not a 
       successor fund which requires premium payments 
       based on the tonnage of coal produced or the number 
       of hours worked by a signatory operator's employees. 
       Rather, under the Coal Act, health benefits are funded 
       by the imposition of what is, in essence, a tax. 
 
Id. at 22-23. Finally, the court relied upon Carbon Fuel Co. 
v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir. 1996), when it held 
that even if Anker was entitled to reimbursement under its 
 
                                11 
  
contract with Consol, Consol still would be entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law because "the Coal Act 
abrogated pre-act contracts reallocating mining companies' 
obligations to pre-Act benefit plans." Id. at 24 n.17. Next 
the district court upheld the constitutionality of the 
application of the Coal Act to Anker in a second 
unpublished decision, and, relying upon our holding in 
Lindsey Coal Mining, 90 F.3d 688, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Combined Fund, its Trustees, and 
the Commissioner on Count Three which sought a finding 
of unconstitutionality. Anker II at 6. 
 
Finally, on July 21, 1998, the district court granted 
summary judgment on the Combined Fund's counterclaim 
for entry of a judgment against Anker and King Knob for 
annual premiums, interest, liquidated damages, attorney's 
fees, and costs. Anker III at 10-11. Anker did not contest 
the assessment of annual premiums. Id. at 6 n.3. 
Considering this fact and Congress's clear intent to provide 
for liquidated damages, interest, attorney's fees, and costs 
if an employer fails to make timely payments, the court 
entered judgment for $1,180,489.06 against Anker and 
King Knob in a third unpublished disposition. Id. at 11. 
Anker and King Knob then appealed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Anker argues that the Coal Act is unconstitutional as 
applied to it according to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131. 
Appellants' Brief at 19-26. Alternatively, Anker urges us to 
reverse the district court's grant of judgment on the 
pleadings against it on Counts One and Two of its 
complaint. Id. at 26-37. Anker repeats its position 
concerning Count One that the Commissioner should have 
assigned the miners at issue to Consol. As to Count Two, 
Anker contends that the district court erroneously found 
paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement between King 
Knob and Consol clear and unambiguous. Consequently, 
Anker believes that the district court erred in not 
considering its parol evidence, and that under our 
precedent, parol evidence is essential to interpreting the 
parties' intent correctly. Moreover, Anker argues that the 
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district court's interpretation of paragraph 4(b) of the 
settlement agreement was simply wrong. Id. at 28-37. 
Finally, Anker contests the district court's awarding the 
Combined Fund interest, liquidated damages, attorney's 
fees, and costs, arguing that the Act does not provide for 
the assessment of these items. Id. at 37-48. 
 
We will affirm the district court's decisions regarding the 
constitutionality of the Act, the correctness of the 
Commissioner's assignments, and the award of interest, 
liquidated damages, fees and costs against Anker. However, 
we will reverse the court's order granting judgment on the 
pleadings on Count Two, Anker's contract claim for 
reimbursement from Consol, and will remand to the district 
court for further proceedings on that count.1 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
In reviewing the district court's order, we examine the 
Commissioner's action under the same standard of review 
properly applied by the district court. See Florida Power & 
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 
1607 (1985). Thus, we review the Commissioner's decision 
as a final agency action brought under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See Lindsey Coal Mining, 90 F.3d at 691; 5 
U.S.C. S 704. Accordingly, the issue is whether the 
administrative determination was "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A).2 See C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of 
Health and Human Servs., 92 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 because the case arises under the Constitution of the 
United States and the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992, 
26 U.S.C. S 9701-9722, and had supplemental jurisdiction over Anker's 
breach of contract claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
2. The district court appears to have reviewed the Commissioner's 
decision de novo, as was also the case in Lindsey Coal Mining, 90 F.3d 
at 691 n.3. However, as we noted there, inasmuch as we "come to the 
same decision as the district court in affirming the Commissioner's 
decision, any application of a different standard of review on its part 
was 
harmless." Id. 
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We review the district court's decision as to the 
constitutionality of the Coal Act as applied to Anker de 
novo. See Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Similarly, our review of the district court's granting of 
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment where 
the district court was not reviewing the Commissioner's 
decisions is plenary. See Smith v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd on 
other grounds, 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999); Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 
1230 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
B. Takings and Due Process Challenges 
 
Our discussion of Anker's constitutional challenge begins 
with Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 
where a fragmented Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Coal Act as applied to a company 
whose coal operations had ceased in 1965. Id. at ___, 118 
S.Ct. at 2143. A majority of the Court struck down the law 
as applied to Eastern Enterprises by relying on two distinct 
theories. The four-justice plurality held that application of 
the Coal Act to Eastern Enterprises violated the Fifth 
Amendment as an unconstitutional taking. Id. at ___, 118 
S.Ct. at 2149. Justice Kennedy, who provided thefifth vote 
striking down the application of the Act, disagreed with the 
plurality's takings reasoning, but found that the Act's 
retroactivity violated due process. Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 
2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting 
in part). The four dissenting justices agreed with Justice 
Kennedy that application of the statute did not violate the 
Takings Clause, yet disagreed with his opinion that the Act 
violated due process. Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2161 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 
To consider Anker's takings and due process claims, we 
first must decide what, if any, holding in Eastern 
Enterprises binds our decision. "When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, `the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds.' " Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 
S.Ct. 990, 993 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
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153, 169 n.15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2923 n.15 (1976)). However, 
as we recognized in Rappa v. New Castle County , 18 F.3d 
1043 (3d Cir. 1994), and reaffirmed in Unity Real Estate, 
1999 WL 167765, at *9, the Marks rule is applicable only 
where "one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as 
`narrower' than another" and can "represent a common 
denominator of the Court's reasoning." Rappa, 18 F.3d at 
1057 (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (en banc)). Thus, in cases where approaches differ, 
no particular standard is binding on an inferior court 
because none has received the support of a majority of the 
Supreme Court. Id. at 1058. 
 
As to the immediate situation, we recognized in Unity 
Real Estate that "Justice Kennedy's substantive due 
process reasoning is not a `narrower' ground that we might 
take to constitute the controlling holding." 1999 WL 
167765, at *9. In such a case, then, the only binding aspect 
of a splintered decision is its specific result, in Eastern 
Enterprises the Court's "holding the Coal Act 
unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises." 
Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 
F.3d 1246, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Eastern Enterprises 
requires a finding that the Coal Act is unconstitutional as 
applied to Anker, then, only if Anker "stand[s] in a 
substantially identical position to Eastern Enterprises with 
respect to both the plurality and Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence." Unity Real Estate, 1999 WL 167765, at *9.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We also recognized in Unity Real Estate that in light of Eastern 
Enterprises' concurrence and dissent, we are "bound to follow the five- 
four vote against the takings claim. . . ." Unity Real Estate, 1999 WL 
167765, at *9. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. 2156 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Coal Act neither targets a specific 
property interest nor depends upon any particular property for the 
operation of its statutory mechanisms."); id.  at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2161 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The `private property' upon which the Clause 
traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or 
intellectual 
property."); also Association of Bituminous Contractors, 156 F.3d at 1254 
n.5 ("The only conceivable change in takings jurisprudence brought 
about by Eastern Enterprises is that thefive dissenting justices . . . 
apparently believe that the imposition of liability alone is not a taking 
of 
property under the Fifth Amendment."). 
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Applying Eastern Enterprises in accordance with the 
foregoing methodology is not difficult inasmuch as its 
plurality and concurrence both found significant the fact 
that Eastern Enterprises was not a signatory to either the 
1974 or 1978 NBCWAs, and thus it did not contemplate 
either being responsible for or contributing to the miners' 
expectation of lifetime benefits. The plurality recognized 
that while the takings inquiry is "essentially ad hoc and 
fact intensive" the Court, in prior decisions, had identified 
three factors that are particularly significant: " `the 
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action.' " 524 U.S. at ___, 118 
S.Ct. at 2146 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 390 (1979)). The plurality 
then summarized its takings case law as follows: 
 
       Our opinions . . . make clear that Congress has 
       considerable leeway to fashion economic legislation, 
       including the power to affect contractual commitments 
       between private parties. Congress also may impose 
       retroactive liability to some degree particularly where it 
       is `confined to short and limited periods required by the 
       practicalities of producing national legislation.' Our 
       decisions, however, have left open the possibility that 
       legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe 
       retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that 
       could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of 
       that liability is substantially disproportionate to the 
       parties' experience. 
 
Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2149 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 476 U.S. 717, 731, 104 S.Ct. 
2709, 2719 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
Applying these precepts, the plurality held that the Coal 
Act placed a "considerable financial burden" upon Eastern 
Enterprises, which was liable for between $50 and $100 
million in cumulative payments. Id. at ___,118 S.Ct. at 
2149. The plurality acknowledged that this type offinancial 
burden was not a per se taking -- "a permanent physical 
occupation of . . . property" -- yet noted that the Court's 
decisions upholding the Multiemployer Pension 
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Amendments Act of 1980 to supplement ERISA suggested 
that "an employer's statutory liability for multiemployer 
plan benefits should reflect some `proportion[ality] to its 
experience with the plan.' " Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2149 
(quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645, 113 
S.Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993)). The plurality found this 
proportionality lacking because "while Eastern contributed 
to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, it ceased its coal mining 
operations in 1965 and neither participated in negotiations 
nor agreed to make contributions in connection with the 
Benefit Plans under the 1974, 1978, or subsequent 
NBCWA's." Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2150 (emphasis added). 
This was significant because the 1974 and subsequent 
agreements "first suggest[ed] an industry commitment to 
the funding of lifetime health benefits for both retirees and 
their family members." Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2150. Thus, 
because Eastern Enterprises never had contemplated 
liability nor contributed to the miners' expectation of 
lifetime benefits, the plurality held that "the correlation 
between Eastern and its liability to the Combined Fund is 
tenuous, and the amount assessed against Eastern 
resembles a calculation `made in a vacuum.' " Id. at ___, 
118 S.Ct. at 2150 (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 1026 
(1986)). 
 
The plurality also found the lack of proportionality 
significant in its analysis of whether the Coal Act 
substantially interfered with Eastern Enterprises' 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and whether 
the nature of the governmental action was unusual. The 
plurality found that the Act's "substantial and particularly 
far reaching" retroactive effect interfered with Eastern 
Enterprises' reasonable investment backed expectations. Id. 
at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2152. It noted that inasmuch as an 
employer in the coal industry could not have contemplated 
that it was promising lifetime benefits until 1974 when 
ERISA forced revisions to the 1950 Fund, the Coal Act's 
"scheme for allocation of Combined Fund premiums is not 
calibrated either to Eastern's past actions or to any 
agreement--implicit or otherwise--by the company." Id. at 
___, 118 S.Ct. at 2152. Likewise, the plurality reasoned that 
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the governmental action was highly unusual and implicated 
fundamental principles of fairness because it "single[d] out 
certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in 
amount, based on the employers' conduct far in the past, 
and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made 
or to any injury they caused. . . ." Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 
2153 (emphasis added). Therefore, each factor suggesting 
that the application of the Coal Act was an unconstitutional 
taking depended upon the fact that Eastern Enterprises 
had left the coal industry in 1965 and had not agreed to 
the 1974, 1978, or subsequent wage agreements. 
 
Justice Kennedy, in finding the Coal Act's application to 
Eastern Enterprises violated substantive due process, also 
relied upon the fact that Eastern Enterprises had not 
signed the 1974 or following agreements. Justice Kennedy 
held that "[a]ccepted principles forbidding retroactive 
legislation" dictated that the application of the Act to 
Eastern Enterprises violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 
___, 118 S.Ct. at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment and dissenting in part). Applying an "arbitrary 
and irrational" standard of review, Justice Kennedy pointed 
out that the assessment of liability against Eastern 
Enterprises bore no legitimate relation to the government's 
asserted interest in holding responsible those coal 
companies that created an expectation of lifetime benefits 
and then abandoned the industry to avoid this 
commitment: 
 
       As the plurality opinion discusses in detail, the 
       expectation was created by promises and agreements 
       made long after Eastern left the coal business. Eastern 
       was not responsible for the resulting chaos in the 
       funding mechanism caused by other coal companies 
       leaving the framework of the National Bituminous 
       Wage Agreement. This case is far outside the bounds of 
       retroactivity permissible under our law. 
 
Id. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2159 (citation omitted) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
 
Thus, analysis of the decisions in Eastern Enterprises 
leads us to the conclusion that a majority of the Court 
would find the Act unconstitutional when applied to an 
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employer that did not agree to the 1974 or subsequent 
NBCWAs, while application of the Act to a signatory to the 
1974 or a subsequent wage agreement would be an entirely 
different matter. 
 
We believe the fact that Anker was a signatory to"me 
too" agreements from the 1970s until 1984 factually 
distinguishes Anker's situation from that of Eastern 
Enterprises and compels a finding that the Act is 
constitutional in this instance.4 This was, in fact, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning 
in Association of Bituminous Contractors, 156 F.3d 1246, in 
upholding the application of the Act to operators similarly 
situated to plaintiffs here. Faced with signatory operators of 
the 1974 and subsequent agreements by incorporation by 
reference in related agreements, the court noted that "the 
crucial fact upon which the Eastern Enterprises plurality 
and Justice Kennedy relied in concluding that Eastern's 
Coal Act liability was disproportionate to its past conduct 
and thus unfairly retroactive--namely, Eastern's departure 
from the coal industry in 1965--is absent in this case." Id. 
at 1256. The court continued: "The clear implication of 
each opinion in Eastern Enterprises is that employer 
participation in the 1974 and 1978 agreements represents 
a sufficient amount of past conduct to justify the 
retroactive imposition of Coal Act liability (for the dissenting 
justices, of course, such participation is not even 
necessary)." Id. at 1257. See also Unity Real Estate, 1999 
WL 167765, at *29 (Aldisert, J., concurring) ("The decisive 
material facts in Eastern Enterprises are that the company 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The difference between a member of the BCOA and a "me too" 
signatory to a NBCWA is of no consequence to this case despite Anker's 
contrary assertions. See, e.g., Connors v. Link Coal Co., 970 F.2d 902, 
903 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (" `Me too' agreements have terms identical to the 
terms of the national agreement, and thus there is no distinction among 
them concerning employers' contractual rights and obligations."); Arizona 
Laborers, Teamster and Cement Masons Trust Fund v. Conquer Cartage 
Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985) (defining a "me too" agreement 
as an agreement by which a smaller employer can obtain all the benefits 
of the master collective bargaining agreement without joining the 
industry association and incurring the costs of participating in industry 
negotiations or negotiating independently with the union). 
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(1) left the coal industry in 1965 and (2) was never a party 
to the 1974 and later Wage Agreements that first suggested 
the commitment to lifetime benefits for retirees and family 
members."). Thus, it appears that this case falls outside the 
specific holding of Eastern Enterprises, and we therefore 
find the Coal Act's application to Anker constitutional. 
 
However, our opinion in Unity Real Estate directs us to 
apply an additional level of due process analysis designed 
to measure "the extent of the gap between the coal 
companies' contractual promises to the Funds and the 
requirements of the Coal Act." Id. at *10. We noted there 
that the proper standard of review for a due process 
analysis is whether Congress's action was arbitrary or 
irrational. Id. We concluded that Congress's determination 
that the coal industry acted in a way that created the 
miners' reasonable expectation of lifetime benefits, and that 
its finding that the coal companies were the most 
responsible parties for the deterioration of the Benefit Plans 
were "reasonable evaluations of the problem." Id. at *20. 
 
We then held that the Act's retroactivity did not render it 
irrational in violation of due process. Id. We recognized that 
the "heart of retroactivity analysis is an evaluation of the 
extent of the burden imposed by a retroactive law in 
relation to the burdened parties' prior acts" and announced 
that "[w]here Congress acts reasonably to redress an injury 
caused or to enforce an expectation created by a party, it 
can do so retroactively." Id. at *20-*21. 
 
In the first step of a retroactivity analysis, we measured 
the length of time of the retroactivity from the date the coal 
company's contractual obligations ceased to the passing of 
the Act, and held that Unity Real Estate's 11 years was not 
so extensive as to violate Justice Kennedy's standard, 
although we admitted that it was a "close case." Id. at *21. 
We, however, recognized that the burden the Coal Act 
imposes upon parties assessed liability is substantial. Id. at 
*22. Finally, turning to the proportionality issue, we found 
that the Coal Act imposes a burden justified by both the 
industry's conduct that created reasonable expectations of 
lifetime benefits -- creating a benefit fund legally obligated 
to pay out more funds than the operators were required to 
provide -- and conduct that created the problem of under 
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funding -- the same initial flaws in the funding mechanism 
compounded by the mass exodus of operators from the 
industry to avoid making further contributions to the 
funds. Id. at *25. This analysis led us to conclude that the 
Coal Act did not violate the Due Process Clause because 
Congress was entitled to redress the problems caused by 
"the companies' actions, through the BCOA through which 
negotiations with the unions were conducted, [which] 
created reasonable expectations about benefits and 
established a funding structure vulnerable to `dumping' 
retirees when companies left the industry." Id. 
 
Applying Unity Real Estate's retroactivity analysis 
compels us to reach a similar conclusion here. The length 
of time since King Knob last agreed in a "me too" contract 
to abide by an NBCWA was eight years, and the length of 
time since King Knob agreed to an NBCWA in a contract 
with Consol was 11 years before Congress passed the Coal 
Act. We found 11 years to be acceptable, although a"close 
case," in Unity Real Estate. Id. at *21. Moreover, our 
proportionality analysis in Unity Real Estate applies full 
force here because King Knob was a signatory to the 1978 
and subsequent NBCWAs, and thus bears the same 
responsibility as the plaintiffs in Unity Real Estate for 
creating the reasonable expectations and the problem of 
under-funding that the Coal Act redresses. Id.  at *25. 
 
While some language in Unity Real Estate suggests that 
we rested our holding on the operators' membership in the 
BCOA which had negotiated the agreements that created 
the miners' expectation of benefits, id. at *16-*18, we will 
not read this language to allow "me too" signatures to avoid 
the application of the Act. King Knob agreed to abide by 
those same NBCWAs that the plaintiffs in Unity Real Estate 
negotiated.5 Similarly, Anker's argument that its liability 
fails Unity Real Estate's proportionality test since King 
Knob was "never" responsible for contributing to the benefit 
funds misses the mark. Anker fails to realize that while 
Consol may have agreed to assume King Knob's payments 
to the benefit funds in its contract-mining agreements 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. One of the plaintiffs in Unity Real Estate, was a "me too" signatory to 
the 1984 NBCWA after dropping out of the BCOA. Id. at *4. 
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spanning 1967 to 1982, King Knob, as a "me too" signatory 
to the NBCWAs was responsible in the first instance for the 
provision of these payments. King Knob's ability to have 
Consol assume this obligation is simply irrelevent to the 
fact that by agreeing to the NBCWAs King Knob was a party 
to the agreements that created the miners' expectation of 
lifetime benefits. King Knob benefitted as much as Consol 
from having the NBCWAs as those agreements kept a 
consistent work force in place in part by promising the 
provision of health and death benefits for the rest of the 
miners' lives. 
 
Overall, inasmuch as nothing germane to our holding in 
Unity Real Estate distinguishes Anker from the plaintiffs in 
Unity Real Estate, application of that case's due process 
analysis leads us once again to conclude that the Act does 
not violate constitutional norms, this time as applied to the 
Anker. Thus, we find the Act constitutional as applied to 
Anker because of the factual distinction that makes Eastern 
Enterprises inapplicable, and because the case falls 
squarely under our analysis and holding in Unity Real 
Estate. 
 
C. The Commissioner's Assignment of Beneficiaries to 
Anker 
 
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision to assign 
beneficiaries to Anker, we decide whether her action was 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). The 
Commissioner rejected Anker's arguments that Consol was 
the entity responsible for providing the miners' benefits. 
Anker had argued to the Social Security Administration 
 
       that assignments made [because of Anker's affiliation 
       with King Knob] should be reassigned to Consolidation 
       Coal Co. because King Knob operated as an 
       independent contractor mining lands owned or leased 
       by Consol with no ownership rights in the minerals; 
       that amounts paid by Consol to the UMWA plans were 
       not deducted or credited against the amounts paid to 
       King Knob for the mined coal; that upon termination of 
       the agreement in 1982 Consol accepted responsibility 
       for current and subsequent payments to the UMWA 
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       Welfare and Retirement Fund or any successor fund 
       based on hours worked prior to the summer of 1982; 
       [and] that for miners employed by King Knob after 
       1982, responsibility should be pro-rated. . . . 
 
App. at 33. The Commissioner instead determined that 
 
       Under the Coal Act, ownership of a mine is immaterial 
       to assignment decisions. Assignments are made solely 
       on the basis of the signatory employer who employed 
       the eligible retiree. In the case involving King Knob, an 
       affiliate of Anker Energy, the signatory that employed 
       the retirees was King Knob, not Consol. Also, for Coal 
       Act purposes, SSA is not bound by any private 
       agreements made between companies, nor does the 
       Coal Act allow for pro-ration of premium payments 
       between companies. In light of the foregoing, no 
       assignments that were made to Anker on the basis of 
       its relationship to King Knob Coal can be reassigned to 
       Consol. 
 
App. at 33. We will affirm the district court's grant of 
judgment on the pleadings on Count One upholding the 
Commissioner's assignment of beneficiaries to Anker, 
because we find that her decision was not "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). 
 
Anker contends that King Knob was merely the "nominal" 
employer of the miners, while Consol was a signatory 
operator in its own right under the Act that had received 
"the entire economic benefit which those miners created," 
and was "the entity which had responsibility for all 
payments required to be made to the UMWA Benefit 
Funds." Appellants' Brief at 26. We find these contentions 
to be without merit. 
 
The Coal Act directs the Commissioner to assign each 
eligible beneficiary to a "signatory operator" who employed 
the beneficiary. 26 U.S.C. S 9706(a). Section 9706(a) also 
attempts to ensure that the specific assignment of a 
beneficiary is to the most recent and significant employer 
still in business. The Act defines a "signatory operator" as 
"a person which is or was a signatory to a coal wage 
agreement." 26 U.S.C. S 9701(c)(1). The term "coal wage 
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agreement" includes "the National Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreement," as well as "any other agreement entered into 
between an employer in the coal industry and the United 
Mine Workers of America that required . . . the provision of 
health benefits to retirees of such employer . . . or 
contributions to the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan or the 1974 
UMWA Benefit Plan, or any predecessor thereof." 26 U.S.C. 
S 9701(b)(1). Finally, the Act provides that "employment of 
a coal industry retiree in the coal industry by a signatory 
operator shall be treated as employment by any related 
persons to such operator." 26 U.S.C. S 9706(b)(1)(A). 
 
Applying these terms here, we uphold the 
Commissioner's conclusion that Anker is a related person 
to King Knob who was responsible for the provision of 
health benefits to the 1950 or 1974 Plans. First, King Knob 
was clearly a signatory operator under the Act. Anker 
admits that King Knob was a "me too" signatory to the 
1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs. App. at 8. Although 
it did not negotiate these agreements, as a "me too" 
signatory King Knob agreed to each of these NBCWAs, and 
agreed to contribute to the benefit funds. As such, King 
Knob falls under the Act. 26 U.S.C. S 9701. 
 
Moreover, Anker does not contest the Commissioner's 
determination that it is a "related person" to King Knob 
under the Act, and we find that King Knob was without 
question the miners' employer. See Appellants' Brief at 26. 
Anker's pleadings and the record reveal as much. As an 
independent contractor, King Knob agreed in its contracts 
with Consol that 
 
       all parties working for it in connection with the 
       undertaking covered by this Agreement shall be its 
       employees subject only to its orders and supervision. 
       . . . Neither Consol nor any of its agents, servants or 
       employees shall have the right to direct, supervise or 
       control the manner or method in which the work is to 
       be performed. 
 
App. at 66. Anker confuses the matter by stating that King 
Knob was only the miners' "nominal" employer, and that 
Consol had received the entire "economic benefit" from the 
miners' efforts. The Act does not mention the term 
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"nominal" employer, nor does the term have any 
independent meaning in the context here. Likewise, the Act 
does not assess premiums based upon who received the 
"economic benefit" of the miners' work. Moreover, we do not 
accept the accuracy of Anker's denial that King Knob 
benefitted economically from its employees' mining efforts. 
After all, Consol was paying King Knob for its services. 
 
Furthermore, we find Anker's argument unpersuasive 
that King Knob was not the correct signatory employer 
because it never had made contributions to the benefit fund 
inasmuch as Consol always paid King Knob's premiums 
according to their mining agreements. As a "me too" 
signatory to the 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs, King 
Knob was responsible for making payments for its 
employees to the benefit funds. Even though Consol 
apparently relieved King Knob of this responsibility by 
making all of its payments to the funds, such a contractual 
agreement does not lead us to conclude that King Knob was 
not a signatory operator responsible for making payments 
to the funds. Thus, we cannot say that the Commissioner's 
assignment of beneficiaries to Anker is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). 
 
D. Contract for Reimbursement 
 
In granting Consol's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings on Count Two the district court relied upon 
contract and statutory interpretation in holding that Consol 
is not liable to reimburse Anker for payments made to the 
Combined Fund for the eligible retirees who worked for 
King Knob pursuant to its mining contracts with Consol. 
First, the court held that the language in the settlement 
agreement6 was clear and unambiguous. Anker I at 22. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Once again, the pertinent portion of the settlement agreement states: 
 
        (b) Consol shall promptly reimburse King Knob for all subsequent 
       payments due to the UMWA Fund or any successor fund 
       attributable to (i) tonnage of coal produced under the Contracts, 
(ii) 
       hours worked at the mine operated under the Robinson Run 
       Contract on or before August 31, 1982, and (iii) hours worked at 
the 
       mines operated under the Booth Contract on or before June 30, 
       1982. 
 
App. at 17, 97. 
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Next, the court determined that inasmuch as the contract 
provides for reimbursement "attributable to" either the 
tonnage of coal produced or the hours miners worked for 
King Knob under the contracts with Consol, King Knob was 
entitled to reimbursement only if the premiums Anker paid 
to the Combined Fund were "attributable to" either factor. 
Id. Because the Coal Act funds health benefits, according to 
the district court, "by the imposition of what is, in essence, 
a tax," it held that Consol was not obligated to reimburse 
Anker for its payments. Id. at 23. The court also held that 
even if Consol was contractually responsible for 
reimbursing Anker, Anker still could not maintain its action 
against Consol because the Coal Act "abrogated pre-act 
contracts reallocating mining companies' obligations to pre- 
Act benefit plans." Id. at 24 n.17. We will reverse the 
district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of Consol on Count Two for reimbursement because 
we reject the district court's conclusions with respect to the 
count. 
 
       1. Contractual liability 
 
Anker urges us to reverse based upon the district court's 
refusal to consider extrinsic evidence in light of its holding 
the contractual language clear and unambiguous. 
Appellants' Brief at 28. Under Pennsylvania law, which is 
applicable here, a court can consider parol evidence only if 
the contractual language is ambiguous. See Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1427-28 
(3d Cir. 1994); Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 78, 
81 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
We hold that the district court erred in deciding that 
paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement is clear and 
unambiguous. The provision states that Consol will 
reimburse King Knob for "all subsequent payments" due to 
the then-current "UMWA Fund" or "any successor fund." 
These payments must be "attributable to" either tonnage of 
coal or hours worked under the contracts. Inasmuch as the 
Coal Act does not assign liability based upon the amount of 
coal mined or hours worked by miners, the court granted 
Consol's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
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In so doing, the court failed to acknowledge that "tonnage 
of coal" and "hours worked" were the methods used to 
determine an employer's premiums for the 1950 and 1974 
Funds. By placing this language in the agreement, the 
parties could have been agreeing, as Anker contends, that 
Consol would be responsible for any payments owed to 
these Funds or any successor fund arising from the work 
performed pursuant to the mining contracts. The district 
court, then, failed to read the mention of "tonnage of coal" 
and "hours worked" consistently with industry usage. 
 
In fact, reading the provision to bind Consol to reimburse 
King Knob for any future benefit payments related to the 
work completed under the contracts would be consistent 
with the parties' inclusion of the term "successor fund" in 
the agreement. As Anker pointed out in its brief, inasmuch 
as there was no "successor fund" to the UMWA Fund at the 
time of the settlement agreement, inclusion of this term 
signifies that the parties were contemplating possible 
responsibility for payment of future benefits to a future 
fund. Appellants' Brief at 33. Otherwise, inclusion of this 
language in the contract makes no sense. 
 
The district court also incorrectly interpreted the contract 
to bar reimbursement because the Coal Act does not assess 
premiums based upon the tonnage of coal and hours 
worked. While the Coal Act does not determine specifically 
the premiums due based upon coal tonnage and hours 
worked, the Act is concerned with operators who had 
contributed to the 1950 and 1974 Plans which were funded 
based on coal tonnage and hours worked. The Combined 
Fund, by its very terms, is a successor plan, born on 
February 1, 1993, when the Act mandated that "the settlors 
of the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan and the 1974 UMWA 
Benefit Plan shall cause such plans to be merged into the 
Combined Fund. . . ." 26 U.S.C. S 9702(a)(2). By 
concentrating on the method of funding and ignoring the 
industry significance of coal tonnage and hours worked, the 
district court incorrectly held that, as a matter of law, 
Consol was not liable to Anker for payments made for King 
Knob's employees under its contracts with Consol. While we 
do not take a position as to Anker's ultimate success in 
proving that Consol is in fact liable to it for the premiums 
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for the miners assigned to it under the Act, we conclude 
that the district court's disposing of the issue on the 
pleadings was premature, and that further proceedings 
with respect to it are necessary.7 
 
       2. Abrogation of contractual agreements 
 
The district court followed the decision of a divided panel 
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Carbon 
Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir. 1996), when 
it held that the Coal Act abrogates private contracts for 
indemnification or reimbursement. Anker I at 24 n.17. 
However, considering the Supreme Court's statements in 
Eastern Enterprises concerning the language of the Act, we 
will not follow Carbon Fuel. Instead, we hold that the Coal 
Act does not prohibit indemnification or reimbursement 
pursuant to previous contractual arrangements. 
 
The Eastern Enterprises plurality stated that "the Act 
preserves Eastern's right to pursue indemnification," 
although it does not grant any new rights, including a right 
to reimbursement. 524 U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2150. The 
Court was referring to 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(6) which states: 
"Nothing in this section shall preclude the right of any 
person to bring a separate civil action against another 
person for responsibility for assigned premiums, 
notwithstanding any prior decision by the Commissioner." 
 
In so stating, the Supreme Court (implicitly) disagreed 
with Carbon Fuel, 100 F.3d 1124, where the court of 
appeals interpreted the Act to prohibit suits for 
indemnification or reimbursement based upon prior private 
contracts. Id. at 1133. The court of appeals relied on 
section 9708, which states that "[a]ll liability for 
contributions to the Combined Fund that arises on or after 
February 1, 1993, shall be determined exclusively under 
this chapter. . . ." The court also found persuasive excerpts 
from the legislative history stating that Congress "expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Consol points out that King Knob retained certain employees after its 
agreements with it were terminated. At this time we do not deal with the 
significance of this fact which was not material to the district court's 
disposition of the reimbursement claim. Of course, paragraph 4(b) of the 
settlement agreement has temporal limits. 
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intended to `reach back' and impose obligations on 
signatories to the NBCWAs notwithstanding that many 
companies had `bargained out of their funding 
obligations.' " Carbon Fuel, 100 F.3d at 1129 (quoting 138 
Cong. Rec. S17566-01, S17603). Despite the fact that no 
language in the Act limits the scope of section 9706(f)(6), 
the court of appeals interpreted its preservation of private 
actions to apply only to "post-Act private agreements and 
contracts." Id. at 1134. 
 
We cannot accept this reasoning. As the concurrence in 
Carbon Fuel pointed out, section 9708's statement that all 
liability will be determined under the Act does not abrogate 
a private party's liability to another private party for 
indemnification. Id. at 1140 (Williams, J., concurring in 
judgment). Instead, this provision provides that"[a]n 
operator assigned Coal Act liability by the Commissioner is 
primarily liable and must pay into the Combined Fund, 
regardless of the operator's private, pre-Act contractual 
rights." Id. Section 9706(f)(6), then, does not provide for the 
reassignment of primary liability for a signatory operator, 
but instead "preserves the right of private civil action for 
determining responsibility for assigned premiums as 
between contracting parties." Id. at 1141. 
 
We agree with this reading of the Act.8  Section 9706(f)(6) 
explicitly preserves a person's right "to bring a separate civil 
action against another person for responsibility for assigned 
premiums. . . ." This provision does not limit itself to post- 
Act contracts, and without an explicit congressional 
statement otherwise, we will not construe the Act to 
contravene the seemingly unambiguous Congressional 
desire to allow for private actions between parties for 
reimbursement or indemnification. 
 
Moreover, we believe that our reading of the Act is, in 
fact, consistent with the legislative history upon which the 
majority in Carbon Fuel relies. While Congress no doubt 
wanted to "reach back" and ensure that companies could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Even if our reading of section 9706(f)(6) is incorrect, we believe that 
we 
would need a clearer expression of Congress's intent for us to agree with 
Carbon Fuel that the Coal Act abrogates an entire class of private 
contracts. 
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not contract out of their obligations to the Funds, the Coal 
Act solves this problem by making the signatory companies 
responsible in the first instance for premiums. Once the 
Commissioner correctly assigns retirees to an operator, 
liability to the Funds is guaranteed. Allowing for 
indemnification between private parties if a previous 
contractual agreement so provides in no way frustrates this 
goal. Indeed, it may further the goal by providing for an 
additional entity to be liable, albeit on a contractual basis, 
for the payments due the Fund. 
 
We believe the correct reading of congressional intent is 
that Congress desired the Act to be remedial -- that 
Congress wanted to ensure that miners would receive the 
benefits the industry promised and placed liability on the 
parties responsible for creating the problem in the first 
place. Whether these parties had contracted with other 
private organizations for indemnification in case of future 
liability is irrelevant. In fact, allowing for indemnification 
could provide for more complete funding inasmuch as small 
independent contractors such as King Knob are probably 
more likely to have gone out of business or to have 
insufficient funds to pay the sometimes substantial 
premiums than companies similar to Consol that owned 
and leased the mines. 
 
Thus, we will reverse the district court's order granting 
Consol's motion for judgment on the pleadings on Count 
Two for indemnification and remand the count to the 
district court for further proceedings. The court erroneously 
found the contractual language clear and unambiguous, 
and erroneously interpreted the Coal Act to prohibit suits 
for indemnification or reimbursement based upon prior 
contractual arrangements. 
 
E. Interest, liquidated damages, attorney's fees and 
costs 
 
Finally, Anker contests the district court's assessment of 
interest, liquidated damages, fees and costs for its failure to 
provide the premiums timely by arguing that the Act does 
not provide for the assessment of these costs. Appellants' 
Brief at 38. We, however, will affirm the district court's 
judgment against Anker for these amounts. Anker misreads 
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the Coal Act, as it incorporates the assessment of 
liquidated damages and fees available in ERISA. See 
Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736, 739 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (affirming without comment the district court's 
order awarding liquidated damages, interest, fees and costs 
under the Coal Act); Holland v. Robert Coal Co., 986 F. 
Supp. 621, 633 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting Combined Fund's 
motion for summary judgment assessing liquidated 
damages, interest, fees and costs), aff'd, 1998 WL 794832 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1998); Holland v. High-Tech Collieries, 
Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1021, 1031-32 (N.D.W. Va. 1996) (same); 
Holland v. Double G Coal Co., 898 F. Supp. 351, 356 
(S.D.W. Va. 1995) (same). 
 
Section 9721 of the Coal Act states that "[t]he provisions 
of section 4301 of [ERISA] shall apply to any claim arising 
out of an obligation to pay any amount required to be paid 
by [the Coal Act] in the same manner as any claim arising 
out of an obligation to pay withdrawal liability under 
[ERISA]." 26 U.S.C. S 9721. Section 4301(b) of ERISA 
provides that the failure of an employer to make a timely 
withdrawal liability payment should be treated in the same 
manner as delinquent contributions. 29 U.S.C. S 1451(b). 
Finally, section 502 of ERISA requires a district court to 
award interest, liquidated damages, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs when a plan successfully enforces 
a demand for delinquent payments. 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(2).9 
 
Applying this statutory scheme to Anker, the district 
court correctly determined that Anker had not made 
contributions, and thus ERISA's enforcement provisions 
concerning delinquent contributions mandated the 
assessment of the proper fees. Anker III at 10. We find this 
decision clearly correct and uphold the judgment against 
Anker.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We have held that interest, liquidated damages, fees and costs are 
mandatory charges in withdrawal liability cases under ERISA. See United 
Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension 
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1986); see 
also Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916 F.2d 85, 191 n.34 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
10. As the district court noted, Anker's reliance on Laborers Health and 
Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 
U.S. 539, 108 S.Ct. 830 (1988), is sorely misplaced in light of the fact 
that, unlike the NLRA which was involved there, the Coal Act specifically 
incorporates ERISA's enforcement provisions. Anker III at 9-10. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order granting judgment on the pleadings on 
Anker's claim on Count One that the Commissioner's 
assignment was erroneous, and will affirm the district 
court's order granting summary judgment on the 
constitutionality of the Act as applied to Anker and King 
Knob on Count Three as well as its award of liquidated 
damages, interest, fees and costs on the counterclaim. 
However, we will reverse the district court's order granting 
judgment on the pleadings on Anker's contractual claim for 
reimbursement on Count Two and will remand the case to 
the district court for further proceedings on that count 
consistent with this opinion. The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. 
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